

The Foundational Stages of the Hamlet Project–An (Bennu-Enu) June - December 1961

Hawra Abdulsatar Abduljabbar¹, Raghad Faisal A. Nfawa²

¹Asst. Lecturer, University of Basrah -Basrah and Arab Gulf studies, Email: Hawraa.abduljabbar@uobasrah.edu.iq.

²University of Basrah College Of Arts, Email: Raghad.faisal@uobasrah.edu.iq.

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ABSTRACT

Several factors led to the launch of the Strategic Hamlet Program, which means the Strategic Villages Group. Following the increase in Vietcong operations against South Vietnam, the competent authorities attempted on April 19, 1961, to develop a plan of action for South Vietnam, to stop communist activity, especially military activity, which threatened the authority of the government in South Vietnam as well as American interests.

The village defense project extended throughout the existence of the strategic Hamlet project. It is clear from this that it was one of the results of the counter-insurgency plan, which was the fortification of villages and self-defense, which was later called. Although the project was the result of the participation of Vietnamese efforts, as well as American assistance to them, it proved its results in the first stage, and this resulted in the development and continuation of the Hamlet project later and became the supporting force for it in expelling the Viet Cong forces.

Key words: Vietnam, Hamlet program, United States and Southeast Asia, President Diem.

INTRODUCTION

After World War II (1939-1945), the liberation movement escalated in the Third World. This coincided with the disintegration of the temporary alliance between the East and the West after the defeat of fascism and Nazism. The Soviet Union began to support those movements, especially those who embraced leftist ideas. This was considered by the United States of America and its Western allies to be a threat to its strategic interests, and a hidden Soviet desire to spread the spirit of communist revolution. Southeast Asia was one of those regions that witnessed the outbreak of an armed struggle to get rid of colonialism and its influence, which allowed the communist powers represented by the Soviet Union and People's China to support movements that used the method of armed struggle. This move made the United States and its local allies use many means to limit the influence of leftist movements, which was increasing. Several projects were proposed in the Republic of Vietnam, to prevent peasants from engaging in or cooperating with these movements. The Hamlet project was the most important of these projects. This research paper is an attempt to shed light on its foundational stages and the American role in proposing and developing that project.

1. Stages of Establishing Strategic Villages (Experimental Stage)

Several factors led to the launch of the Strategic Hamlet Program, which means the Strategic Villages Group(1). Following the increase in Vietcong(2) operations against South Vietnam, the competent authorities attempted on April 19, 1961, to develop a plan of action for South Vietnam, to stop communist activity, especially military activity, which threatened the authority of the government in South Vietnam as well as American interests (3). So a project was proposed by an interdepartmental US task force, consisting of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of International Cooperation, the US Agency for International Development, and the Office of the President. The work team also benefited from advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet Headquarters, the Advisory Group for Military Assistance, as well as the participation of the US Ambassador in Saigon (4).

The committee reached a set of measures that must be taken to prevent the communists from controlling Vietnam, and included the military, psychological, and political aspects as well as the economic aspect, as well as the aspect of secret and intelligence work, if all of these commandments come together to ultimately form a project that "helps in the independence and freedom of Vietnam and enhances the

feeling of democracy.” (5). The most important of these recommendations are: 1) Strengthening President Ngo Dinh Diem’s confidence in the United States of America through a number of measures and messages related to the visit of the US Vice President to Vietnam, as well as sending many politically influential figures between the two countries. 2) Attempting to strengthen President Diem’s popular position through negotiations and re-evaluation. This is done under the supervision of Ambassador Frederic Nolting. 3) Starting negotiations and agreements that serve both the American and Vietnamese parties, while not adhering to or adopting those agreements unless they are reviewed by the President. American. 4) Negotiating in the most appropriate way possible to strengthen Vietnam’s relationship with other countries, especially Cambodia, which has common borders with Vietnam and was infiltrated by communists. 5) Strengthening control over Vietnam’s borders, especially those with Cambodia, and encouraging President Diem to renew negotiations on the agreements related to that matter with the Cambodian side, and if he agrees to that, the United States will do everything in its power to facilitate those negotiations. 6) Cooperating with the government of Vietnam to achieve the best assistance. It is possible for it to confront the National Liberation Front, relying on a team with solid experience in this regard. 7) Preparing the diplomatic situation and atmosphere if the United States sends its forces to Vietnam. 8) Dividing the political situation. If the increase in Vietnamese government forces grows from (20,000) to (170,000), 9) Ambassador Nolting must take the necessary measures regarding reorganizing the work team to achieve what was mentioned in (paragraph one and two) (9). 10) By mid-1961, the Cold War had intensified with the worsening of the Berlin crisis. During the Vienna summit meeting, in June 1961, between the United States of America and the Soviet Union(10), Nikita Khrushchev once again(11) affirmed his country’s commitment to supporting the liberation movements in the Third World, which exacerbated the fears of the American administration, so some of Kennedy’s advisors began urging him to make a comprehensive effort in Vietnam (12), as Walt Rostow(13), the White House advisor and some senior US army officers in South Vietnam, called for the use of more measures. As a deterrent (to combat insurgency), such as the use of helicopters and commando forces, he also warned that to change the situation, the United States of America must win in Vietnam, while confirming the possibility of dealing with the communist method of guerrilla warfare. For example, American Air Force intelligence insisted, however, the end of the war in South Vietnam depends on a set of social, economic, political and military measures. Which aims to win (14) “the hearts and minds of people”(15). McGarr agreed that “significant military advances cannot be fully effective until political progress is made.” She also stressed the necessity of developing an integrated military-civilian project for pacification in South Vietnamese villages, and the National Plan should be based on pledging the areas. Main and expanding the provision of services to the liberated provinces until the situation stabilizes in the entire country (16).

As a result, the Counterinsurgency Project remained the official strategy of the United States of America that President Kennedy brought to South Vietnam (17). All of these factors, circumstances, and proposed projects came together to form the Hamlet Strategic Project, and were among the most important reasons that helped launch that project. The rural projects in late 1961 were mainly linked to the growth of communist activities in the South Vietnamese countryside, such as the Agrovillage project and (development centers),for Rural Community), which is generally designed to achieve the security and well-being of rural communities through the establishment of strategic villages, as well as government control over rural areas (18).

Since the Agrovillage project achieved limited success, and gradually began to move to the later strategic villages project, as the Diem regime tried to avoid the mistakes of Agrovillage, the government of South Vietnam attached great importance to the philosophical values, which Diem and those close to him believed were inherent in the Agrovillage villages, and the latter referred to the plan The new one is considered important (19) “to build a new society based on social justice and brotherhood” (20).

However, it is clear from the available evidence the extent to which there is any real effort to implement these goals, as the resettlement process within the framework of the Agrovillage experiment sought to build security-fortified villages. At the same time did not take into account social conditions, customs and traditions, as was the case in other experiments in (Malay) with which the Agrovillage programs and Hamlet project villages were established, and as a result of the cessation of the promotion of the Agrovillage project in 1961. Because it did not achieve the success that was expected, the government’s efforts (21), were transferred from Agrovillage to the strategic villages of Hamlet in June of 1961 in what is called, "Agro-Hamlet", through which the government sought to meet some of the farmers' objections. As a result, the project initially included one hundred families who were resettled again in villages located near the lands that had been cultivated by their occupants (22).

The project began in June 1961. On the twenty-fourth of the same month, a reference appeared in the official Vietnamese media to the visit of the Minister of State for Civil Work, Prong Hieu, to a number of tactical villages, in areas of strategic importance (23). Nhu asked Tearn Kim Tuyen, Head of the

Presidential Service for Political and Social Research, to prepare a study of different strategies (to combat insurgency). Tuyen, who had collected a number of reports on the problems of the Agroville project, formed an office to look into the security situation, as well as experiments. Other foreign affairs that may be related to the situation in Vietnam, and Twain explained the role that strategic communities can play as a framework for pacification (24).

In a subsequent discussion with Harry Hohler, the British ambassador to Saigon (1960-1963), Nhu summarized his reliance on successful experiences in other countries that faced communist opposition movements in Malaya and Indochina, and also pointed to the success of implementing collective farms in Israel (25).

It seems that the strategic Hamlet project itself was developed for local experiments in several provinces, including (TayNinh) in the southeast of the country, (Quang Ngai) on the southern coast of Vietnam on the South China Sea, and (Vinh Long). - Vinh Long) It is located in the Mekong Delta in the south of the country. In TayNinh, the border province of Saigon, local Catholic priests, with the help of provincial authorities, began organizing "combat villages" in June 1961, and this assistance included building watchtowers and training youth. Local people, and establishing committees to manage the villages of the Hamlet Project (26). From this it becomes clear that these villages were established since the Agarville project, and when the Diem government agreed to establish the strategic Hamlet project, these villages were developed in light of the start of the new project, and they were in their experimental stage.

Meanwhile, in Quang Ngai, an ancient Viet Minh stronghold and one of the most insecure provinces in central Vietnam, local authorities began fortifying "fighting villages," so called because they relied on the villagers to protect themselves against Viet Cong attacks, in preparation for a confrontation. Communist attacks (27). Nguyen Van Tat, the district chief, told his subordinates that the goal was to raise the morale of the local forces (28).

In addition, in mid-1961, Major LwvanPhuac established three models of strategic villages in the village of Tan An, which is located southwest of Saigon and is the capital of Long An Province in the Mekong Delta. Which became exhibition places for officials from Saigon and other provinces. In addition, he compiled a series of guidebooks on establishing strategic villages to distribute to local officials and cadre teams, and also sent copies of them to the central government. In it, Louvain Phuac stressed that the hamlet, which consisted of Of the larger village, it was the appropriate place to start if the regime wanted to organize the state (from the bottom up), which is the policy advocated by the Vietnamese administration, if the government sought to develop its rural infrastructure, and at the same time crush the activity of the National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong forces, the military arm. For it, it must start from that lower level of community life, and it also included a curriculum for training youth militias, strengthening local organizations, and establishing new village committees. Phuac emphasized that the political aspects were more important than the military aspects, and thus the Viet Cong settlements did not have elaborate fortifications, but rather relied This includes central defense centers, a stronger organization at the town level, and youth militias (29).

Bui Van Long, the Vietnamese Minister of the Interior, was particularly active in this regard, leading the government's efforts to stimulate local action and improve its policy coordination, holding numerous meetings with lower-level officials, and soliciting suggestions on how to strengthen the regime's presence in the villages. In 1961, he instructed provincial chiefs to submit plans to pacify their territories, and the path he took, in places like Vinh Long, fit well with the government's attempts to strengthen the local role in provincial administration (30).

It seems that strategic small villages are more politically viable, as well as being less financially burdensome, which made the American side interested in supporting the expansion of the Hamlet project, as the United States plan to combat communism called for increased efforts to improve economic life in the countryside in order to gain residents of those areas. Its recommendations included government payment for labor in agricultural villages, as the regime resumed the project, and resettlement subsidies, "as the presidential project" (31) (John F. Kennedy called for) measures such as "rural development - civic action." and the establishment of "experimental agricultural projects," for which John Kennedy pledged to increase American support in the letter delivered by his Vice President Johnson to Diem in May 1961. All of these proposals found more realistic expression in the recommendations of the Joint Finance Committee (32), led by (Eugene Maali), From the Stanford Research Institute and Vu QuocThuc, a professor of law at the Saigon University School of Law in mid-July 1961, their report proposed US support for the construction of one hundred new agricultural centers, describing these settlements as "one of the most promising methods of combating war" gangs." However, if the Diem regime chose to link its plans to American support in this way, it was based on analyzing the Vietnamese government mechanism with increasing suspicion. For example, Kennedy accepted the recommendations of the Stanley Report, but faced uncertainty about the exact costs of the project and continuing internal

divisions over the policy of the United States of America, he did so “without a financial commitment of specific amounts over a period of time” (33).

In mid-1961, the first roots (of the Hamlet or Strategic Villages project) began. Which began with Vietnamese efforts, but as a result of President Kennedy's insistence to develop solutions to combat (insurgency) in Vietnam, the United States of America began to introduce "experts" at all levels of the government apparatus in South Vietnam to improve efforts against communist militants (34). Most Vietnamese states later established strategic villages (35), and by the end of July 1961, the establishment of the first organized strategic hamlet was announced (36). Phuc claimed that the experiment had already proven its worth, and he intended to gradually expand the strategic village scheme to include all settlements in the province, despite the experiments in (TayNinh, Quang Ngai, Vinh Long). It appears to have arisen from a local initiative, but it was accompanied by Destiny's growing interest in a community-focused approach to security. It undoubtedly also reflected the pressure that local subordinates felt coming from the capital as the crisis worsened in the countryside, and the US Embassy praised the plan's achievements (37).

2. Second Stage: of the (Hamlet Project) and Fortifying Villages through the (Bennu-Enu) Project

Several circumstances had accumulated since the end of 1960, leading to the activation of the “Village Defense Project” in a confirmed and official manner. By September 1961 and the end of the year, it had become clear in both South Vietnam and the United States of America that the influence of the Viet Cong was on the rise. The impact of North Vietnam's declaration in 1960 of the dual goal of overthrowing President Diem and reuniting Vietnam under communist rule.

The Viet Cong began to increase the pace of its guerrilla activity, sabotage, and propaganda war against the Diem government. Also, regular forces were organized into the National Liberation Front. As a result, South Vietnam once again became a testing ground for the American commitment to managing the challenges posed by communist guerrilla warfare (38). As a result, some of Kennedy's advisors began urging him to make a comprehensive effort in Vietnam. Besides, in August 1961, David Nuttle was ordered to go to Saigon and meet with the American ambassador to South Vietnam (39), Nolting, and a high-level team of American leaders there too discuss the situation in the Central Highlands. This team consisted of General Lionel GarrasMcGarr of the Advisory Group on Military Assistance, William Colby of the CIA, and Wendy Bayle of the United States Information Agency, who in turn presented their strategy for the Central Highlands to David Nuttle. They asked for his comments (40).

In the beginning, the United States of America had (746) military advisors, but at the end of 1961 they had more than (3,400) advisors (41) in South Vietnam. The Military Assistance (42) Advisory Group initially focused on confronting the political propaganda of the Viet Minh Action Committee which was inciting against the Diem regime (43), and the goal of the village defense project, which was mentioned previously, was to focus most of the tasks of the Air Force in Vietnam on the plans of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (44) (CIDG) (45) which is an abbreviation for (Civilian Irregular Defense Group). The latter project was originally initiated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and began training and equipping local forces to fight the Viet Cong, and was designed to combat the recruitment of peasant youth for the Viet Cong forces and break their control in rural areas (46). In the fall of 1961, the situation in South Vietnam was dangerous. The Vietcong forces escalated their operations significantly and even briefly captured a provincial city located only 55 miles from the capital, Saigon. The US Central Intelligence Agency reported that Diem faced a long and difficult struggle, and that it expected a coup against Diem in August of that year (47). In light of that, the American journalist and political historian (Theodore H. White) (49) said, “The situation will get worse almost week after week,” and the fighters took control of almost every area in the southern delta. Because of concern about the increasing number of wars of national liberation around the world, President John Kennedy, with the support of the US Congress, increased economic and military aid to South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Among that aid were several plans, such as: The plan to improve agricultural conditions for villages in the central highlands (50) as well as a covert CIA effort aimed at collecting information about the activities of the Viet Cong (51). As a result, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) infiltrated the dense jungles of the mountainous border areas, while the agency assessed the development of the paramilitary capabilities of selected groups of the population local, and provided official development assistance allocated to the CIA cover organization (52).

This was especially critical in remote areas such as the Central Highlands of the II Corps Area (sometimes called the II Corps Technical Area), in many of which the Viet Cong ruled in those areas because the ARVN would not risk entering them (53). Instead of ceding these areas to the Viet Cong, the CIA special committee concluded that the Montagnards were loyal allies of Saigon and anti-communists in those areas, so it tried to establish fortified villages and safe havens for them under government control (54),

and move their families there, but Natal did not agree to The team's proposed strategy, because he believed that the Montagnards would not accept the imposition of any restrictions on their movement, as their livelihood depended on their ability to live in their villages and access their fields, so he proposed a project that he discussed with (Gilbert B. Layton), the director of military operations at the CIA station in Vietnam (55), stipulated the organization, training and arming of the Montagnards and allowing them to defend their villages themselves and fight the Viet Cong (56). It took another two months, until early October 1961, before Natal received approval from the CIA station chief in South Vietnam(57), William Colby, to implement his idea. The latter was aware of the strategic importance of the region, but also knew of the complex relationship between the indigenous people and the Vietnamese. There was no way the CIA could launch such a project without at least the tacit approval of South Vietnam, as it had been agreed with Nhu, the president's brother. Diem regarding the initial thinking of the project, and he obtained initial approval with the Rhade tribe (59), one of the tribes that inhabited the central highlands in the south of the country, and it was named the "Village Defense Project" on October 5, 1961, after which Nattel resigned. From the International Services Organization, he began his work with the Central Intelligence Agency. Three days later, he was on a CIA plane heading (60) to Ban Me Thuot, the capital of Darlak Province in the Central Highlands, where the first team began work, and it was Jack Banfiel, the CIA officer responsible for the mission, divided his time between Saigon and Darlac and coordinated with the district team at the US Embassy. A figure from the Rady tribe also worked as a translator with Natal during his work on a campaign with the organization, as he was fluent in the Vietnamese language. And Rhodi and English (61).

While Paul Campbell, a US Special Forces medic, took over the Rady tribe's medical problems to increase goodwill, one of the conditions set by Diem before agreeing to the pilot project was that the project must be supervised by Vietnamese Special Forces. For this reason, a captain from the control group (77) arrived at the site at the beginning of November 1961, with ten additional soldiers from the Special Forces. Diem knew of the tense relationship between the Montagnards and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, so they were chosen with great care. None of them were of Vietnamese origin, but all of them were residents of the Central Highlands. Half of them were from the Rade tribe and the other half were from the Garay tribe. While the general situation in the Central Highlands was rapidly deteriorating, the communists realized that Diem's treatment of minorities and the policy of resettling Catholic refugees specifically had alienated many of the tribes, and about a week after their arrival in the village of Ban Mai Thuot Nettle and Paul Campbell began touring Rady's villages to find a suitable place to start. Sergeant Campbell wore civilian clothes and interacted with the villagers, while Nettle talked politics with the elders. Y Jo, the village chief, was an old friend of David Nettle. When he visited the village often during his time at the International Services Organization, on the first visit in early October, Wai Jo's daughter fell ill and was treated by Dr. Paul. During the treatment, Campbell was very respectful of the traditions of the Rady tribe, as he did not use drugs except at certain times. After the last days of October were devoted to negotiations on how to start the project, the villagers, some of whom had known Natal for years and trusted him, were different from the Americans. They knew that the Americans had plans just as the French did, and they wanted to avoid being exploited. After visiting more than two Ten villages. The team settled in the village of BuonEnao, in Dak Lak Province, a village located two miles from Ban Mai Thuot(62) in the center of the town of Rady. The BuonEnao experiment, by presidential decree, became an experiment. National, so that name came after the city, and it was scheduled that the Joint Studies Department would control it only, not the Vietnamese army or the American mission, and since October 1961 the project was headed by David Nattel(63).

Later, the Rady family proved that they were experienced opponents with a strong sense of their interest in the American cause. Therefore, they set three conditions for their participation: First, the attacks on the Montagnard villages by the Vietnamese army and air force had to be stopped immediately. Second, the Rady villages that were forced to support the National Front would receive. Third, the project to defend the village must be accompanied by medical, educational, and agricultural aid. The Americans and South Vietnamese quickly agreed to the terms, and the pilot project began in earnest (64). However, the Southern Vietnamese Army was also vulnerable, with villagers acting as a National Guard, or self-defense force, and after two weeks of talks and medical treatments for Campbell, the elders agreed and swore allegiance to begin the village defense project (65). The Montagnards built a protective bamboo fence around their villages (66), dug shelters to protect the elderly, women and children from the Viet Cong attack, built a training center, built a medical clinic, and established an investment network that tracks movement in the village and turned it into an early warning system against external attacks (67). A sign was placed on the fence clearly indicating that the village was loyal to the central government in Saigon, and the South Vietnamese government stated that firearms would not be distributed to anyone before the

army searched the village, so the villagers defended themselves with bows and arrows at first, and a force was established. Defending the village, and training some of its residents as paramedics as well (68). Finally, in mid-November 1961, a Vietnamese army inspection team led by Colonel Tung (PonInu) arrived, were impressed by what they saw and agreed that the villagers should receive modern firearms. In mid-December of the same year, Diem himself and Colby also visited the village and were impressed by its organization. Based on that visit, which was approved by the Central Intelligence team, Diem authorized the expansion of the aforementioned project (69), by expanding to forty additional villages from Rady villages within a fifteen-kilometre radius of (Bon Ino), provided that the Rady villages enter the project on a volunteer basis under the same conditions as in (Bon Ino), and all volunteers were trained in modern weapons to defend the village (70).

Now it becomes clear that the village owners later obtained modern firearms after their inspection phase, and a volunteer unit called the Strike Force was allocated to guard the villages while training their volunteer defenders. Some of them used the Strike Force unit as a reserve force to assist the villages under attack, informing the village heads and sheikhs about the project, An armed information unit was trained to travel freely from village to village with songs and plays to convey awareness of the concepts of the project. Various Vietnamese Army agencies, the United States Operations Mission, and its Information Service requested support for social, economic, and information projects (71), to form half a US Army Special Forces detachment. (6) men and (10) other members of the Vietnamese Special Forces Rady and Garay, paramilitary training, the village medic project was to be expanded on a priority basis, with training conducted in Bon Inu, to push members of each village to participate in the project as they were provided with an alarm device of two-way audio, and the United States of America had to provide communication devices. The American Special Forces trained volunteers on these devices, examined and verified every village leader, and determined his identity, photographed and approved by every Rady tribe sheikh, and complete records had to be kept for everyone who owned weapons (72).

The intelligence and secret informant base was to be expanded rapidly to prevent Viet Cong infiltration of the project villages. The expansion in Bon Inu proved successful. Within just two months, the village became a training base for more villages that joined the project (73). By mid-December 1961, the Bon Inu project was completed, and another fifty men from neighboring villages were trained as a local security force or offensive force to protect Bon Inu and its environs. The village chiefs and sub-chiefs were to receive defense training as well. In addition, Kolbe agreed to expand the non-defense group. System in the high plateau and experimented with political work in ethnic Vietnamese communities in the lowlands. The headquarters agreed to arm (1,200) Montagnard assistants as an additional element in the Cantom province and to establish teams whose mission was to provide local self-defense and improve village administration in the lowland communities. In December 1961, the first team of American Special Forces arrived and began implementing the project in those areas (74). After that, the village defense project developed very quickly, as it included (200 villages) more between April and October of 1962 (75). The researcher cannot talk about the conditions of the project The defense of the village in 1962, until its chronology according to the thesis.

In any case, the village defense project extended throughout the existence of the strategic Hamlet project. It is clear from this that one of the results of the counter-insurgency plan was the fortification of villages and self-defense, which was later called, although the project was the result of the participation of Vietnamese efforts, as well as American assistance. To them, it proved its results in the first stage, and this resulted in the development and continuation of the Hamlet project later and became the supporting force for it in expelling the Viet Cong forces.

Then, at the end of December 1961, President Kennedy expressed his commitment to the Diem government. Representatives of American officials began to praise Diem at every opportunity in order to improve the relationship during that period, as the American mission in Saigon was known for its stagnation and extremism, and America's policy was deliberately and consciously optimistic, as there was another factor that influenced Kennedy's decision, although it seems clear. We must remember that 1961 was a year of many international and internal challenges, as South Vietnam did not have priority. Perhaps we can see this through several problems that were preoccupying the United States of America, which is the issue of (Cuba, The Berlin issue, the Nuclear Weapons Issue (76). The work of the (Binu-Ainu) project was completed by the Montagnard residents with American assistance. The project became effective in ridding the residents of the central highlands of the communist forces spread in South Vietnam, which posed a serious challenge to the authority of the central government, whose army was unable to reach that region as a result. It fell into the hands of the Viet Cong, so they relied on the minorities present there and supported them financially and morally, as well as military support in the last months of 1961. It seems that these minorities were coexisting with the Viet Cong elements, however, after they were seduced by the United States of America - and Diem, they turned against them.

CONCLUSION

The Hamlet Project was designed as a large-scale security campaign that sought to concentrate the South Vietnamese rural population in more defensible locations where they could be protected and more easily separated from the Viet Cong. It was supposed to prevent the Viet Cong from obtaining their supplies and soldiers from the villages. This idea was supported and encouraged by the United States of America. The United States of America welcomed any idea that might weaken communist influence in the region. In addition to that project, the American administration realized that some Vietnamese minorities must be made to cooperate with the central government in Saigon, in confronting the influence of the Viet Cong on its lands, and making them a tool for curbing communist activity there. So it launched another project that sought to train and arm the local population in the Central Highlands region. The Central Intelligence Agency and the US Department of Defense cooperated to test this project on the residents of the Montagnard tribe, which achieved important success in curbing the influence of the Viet Cong.

Footnotes

(1) Strategic Villages: They are known as the Strategic Hamlet Project, which began its application in March of the year 1962, following the completion of the experimental project that began in mid-1961, through the cooperation of the Government of Vietnam, headed by Diem, with the United States of America during the era of President John F. Kennedy, with the aim of isolating the peasants in the Vietnamese countryside from the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). The first phase of the project was (Sunrise Science 1-2), in Binu Dong Province in the plain north of Saigon in 1962, but the project later failed for several reasons, such as the crisis. Buddhism and the assassination of Diem. For more, see: The Secret History of the Vietnam War (from the Pentagon Papers), translated by: Muhammad Anis and Hamdi Al-Jawad, Part 2, Cairo, Dr. T, pp. 128-129; PhongwenGiap, Who Will Win in Vietnam, 1st edition, Dar Al-Tali'ah, Beirut, 1971, p. 10; RaghdaMunther Hani Ahmed, PhongwenGiap and his military and political impact in Vietnam 1911-1975, unpublished master's thesis, College of Education for the Humanities, University of Diyala, 2022, p. 172.

(2) Known by its abbreviation (VC), a guerrilla force that fought, with the support of the North Vietnamese Army, against South Vietnam and American forces, from the late 1990s until 1975. The name is said to have been used for the first time by the President of South Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Diem to downplay the insurgents. By the summer of 1964, the Viet Cong's battlefield successes led the US administration to conclude that only major military intervention could save South Vietnam from falling into the hands of the communists. Although it began in the mid-1950s as a group of Various leftist and nationalist groups opposed to President Diem's government, but in 1960 the Viet Cong became the military arm of the National Liberation Front (NLF). In 1969, the NLF joined other groups in areas of South Vietnam that were under Viet Cong control to form the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The movement's main goals were to overthrow the government of South Vietnam and reunify Vietnam, which was achieved in 1975 when American forces withdrew from Saigon. See:

Cindy Coffey, The Rise of the Viet Minh A Study of Militant Nationalism and Communism in Vietnam, London, 2012, p.16-18.

(3) The decline in the influence of the traditional European powers (Britain and France) after the end of World War II led to the rise in the influence of two new opposing powers, namely the Soviet Union, which supported communism, as well as China, and the United States of America, which sought to try to stop the growth of communist activity in the region. Moreover, The victory achieved by the Communists in China had created a danger that threatened Western interests in general and American interests in particular in Southeast Asia. See:

Ibrahim Fenjan Al-Emarah and FaryalSabr Ali, The position of the US President Johnson administration on the political situation in Laos 1964-1968, Basra Research Journal for the Humanities, Issue 4, Volume 41, University of Basra - College of Education for the Humanities, 2016, p. 165.

(4) Memo , From the Vice President from : RosuellL.Gilpatric (Ncs) , to : Rostou (White House) , program From South Vietnam , May 6 , 1961 .

(5) Telegram , Department of State to the Ampassy in Saigon , May 20 ,1961.

(6) Ngo Dinh Diem (1901-1963): He was born in 1901, and in 1933 he worked as Minister of the Interior in the government of Emperor Baodai, then he was relieved of his position at the instigation of France. He worked in Japanese intelligence in World War II, and founded a pro-Japanese political party. But he was arrested after the success of the 1945 revolution, and he spent six months in prison, then Ho Chi Minh released him. He soon immigrated to the United States of America, where the CIA embraced him, and he met Senator Mike Mansfield and a CIA man named Donovan. He assumed the position of President Ministers of State of Vietnam in 1954, and announced the establishment of the First Republic. He was

assassinated in November 1963. See: Laila Al-Jabali, *The Revolution Triumphed in Vietnam*, Abdeen Press, Cairo, 1975, p. 49; Kazem Jawad Ahmed Al-Obaidi, *American-Australian relations during the Vietnam War 1954-1966 (documentary study)*, Madad Al-Adab Magazine, Al-Mustansiriyah University, College of Education, Issue: 20, D. T, p. 331.

(7) United State , Telegram , Department of State , presidential program for Vietnam, to the Ampassy in Saigon , cable , Bowles chester , May 20 ,1961, Digital National Security Archive .

(8) Frederick Nolting (1911-1989): Born on August 24, 1911, he graduated from the University of Virginia in 1933, obtained a master's degree in history from Harvard University in 1941, and a doctorate from the University of Virginia. He served in the US Navy during World War II. He joined the US State Department in 1946, and became Head of Northern European Affairs 1948-1949, responsible for Swiss affairs 1949-1950, coordinator of the Far East Aid Project 1950, member of the US delegation at the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Assistant Secretary of State 1951, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1953-1955. In 1957 he was appointed by President Dwight Eisenhower as Permanent and Alternate Representative to NATO. He became Ambassador to Vietnam from 1961-1963. In 1970 he joined the faculty of the University of Virginia, becoming the founding director of the Miller Center for Foreign Affairs. General, he died on December 14, 1989. See :

Administrative Information, Frederick E. Nolting Oral History Interview, Washington D.C., 1990.p.2.

(9) United State , Telegram , Department of State , presidential program for Vietnam, to the embassy in Saigon , cable , Bowles chester , May 20 ,1961, Digital National Security Archive .

(10) Jong - chul Park , the China Factor In united States Decision – Making Toward Vietnam , 1945-1965, unpublished dissertation , the University of Connecticut 1990, P.166.

(11) Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971): Born on April 17, 1894, he joined the Russian Communist Party in 1918 and was the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (1953-1964), and became Prime Minister of the Soviet Union (1958-1964). He criticized Joseph Stalin's style after his death, he followed a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the capitalist West. He died on November 11, 1971. See: Samir Muhammad Ismail Al-Waziri, *Nikita Khrushchev and his internal policy in the Soviet Union (1894-1971)*, unpublished doctoral thesis, College of Arts - University of Baghdad, 2020, pp. 37-44.

(12) Jong - chul Park , the China Factor In united States Decision – Making Toward Vietnam , 1945-1965, unpublished dissertation , the University of Connecticut 1990, P.166.

(13) Walt Rostow (1916-2003): Born on October 7, 1916, he was a professor and political theorist. He worked in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, then a foreign policy advisor and speech writer for presidential candidate John F. Kennedy. He played an important role in shaping American foreign policy in Southeast Asia. He was a strong anti-communist, and was famous for his belief in the effectiveness of capitalism and free enterprise. He strongly supported the United States' participation in the Vietnam War, and served as National Security Advisor to President Lyndon Johnson from 1966 to 1969. He died on February 13th. 2003. See :

Jeffrey Milken, *Walt Rostow and his theory: THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH*, New York ,1984,p.13-14.

(14) Ibid , pp.169-170.

(15) Ibid .

(16) Howard Jones , *Death of a Generation : How The Assess Inactions of dime And jfk Prolonged The Vietnam War* , Oxford university Press , 2003 , p.91.

(17) Howard Jones ,op , cit , p.143.

(18) Milton E. Gsborne , *Strategic Hamlets in South Viet-Nam* , South east Asia pram Public Actions Southeast Asia NogramCbrnell university New York , 2002 , P.24.

(19) Milton E. Gsborne , op, cit.,, p. 23.

(20) Ibid .

(21) Ibid , p.24 .

(22) Ibid , p. 25.

(23) Milton E ,op, cit., P.25 .

(24) Phillip E. Catton , *Counter – Insurgency and Nation Building : the Strategic Hamlet Program in South Vietnam ,1961-1963*, the International History Review , xxi .4, Britannia Royal Naval College , Dartmouth , December 1999 , P.114 .

(25) Phillip E. Catton op, cit., P.114.

(26) Ibid .

(27) Ibid .

(28) Ibid .

(29) Phillip E. Catton , op, cit., , p.115.

(30) Ibid .

- (31) Ibid , P.117 .
- (32) Ibid , P.117 .
- (33) Ibid , P.118 .
- (34) Memo, For the President ,from : the White House , Washington , South East Asia August , 11 , 1961.
- (35) Phillip E. Catton , Counter – Insurgency and Nation Building : the Strategic Hamlet Program in South Vietnam ,1961-1963, the International History Review , xxi .4, Britannia Royal Naval College , Dartmouth , December 1999 , P.923.
- (36) Milton ,op, cit., P.25 .
- (37) Phillip E. Catton,op.cit., P.115 .
- (38) Jong ChulPark , op , cit.,P167 .
- (39) Ibid , P.168 .
- (40) Dominique page , the Quit War Counterinsurgency programs During the Vietnam War – French , American , and Vietnam Mese Experiences from 1952 to 1964, unpublished Dissertation , Harvard university March , 2019 , P.51 .
- (41) Benedict Anderson, Vietnam and war, new York ,1998, 91.
- (42) Jong Chul Park , op, cit., P.168 .
- (43) Alexander Vucinich , American Intervention in Vietnam War 1956 -1963 , Stanford , California : Stanford University press , 1990, P.77 .
- (44) William J.Gregor , Intervention in intrastate war , the Millitary planning problem, in statute for National strategic security , National Defense university Vol.5,No I,Washington , 2014, P.66 .
- (44) Civil Irregular Defense Plans (CIDG): A project developed by the US Central Intelligence Agency in early 1961 to confront the expansion of Viet Cong influence in the central highlands of South Vietnam. The project began in the village of BuonEnao, and small A teams of US Army Special Forces moved in. Known as the Green Berets, they returned to villages and set up development centers there, focusing on local defense and civil work. Villagers were trained and armed to defend the village for two weeks, while local forces received better training and weapons and served as a quick reaction force to respond to Viet Cong attacks. The vast majority of CIDG camps were initially inhabited by residents of the country's ethnic minority areas (particularly Montignard), who hated both North and South Vietnamese. The project was widely successful, as once one village was pacified, it served as a training camp for the villages. Other local, by 1963, the US Army felt that the project was a great success, but also that its and Special Forces units were not being properly employed, and ordered Operation Switch Back, which transferred control of the plan from the CIA to the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. The project then expanded, and the entire 5th Special Forces Division of the US Army moved to Vietnam, and the plan's units stopped focusing on village defense, and instead participated in more traditional operations, most notably border control. Most of the members of that project were converted into commando units. In the Vietnamese Army, starting in 1970. See:
Eugene G. Piasecki, Civilian Irregular Defense Group: The First Years: 1961-1967, New York, p.2-31988.
- (45) William J.Gregor , op, cit., p.66.
- (46) Jong Chul Park , op, cit., P.169 .
- (47) Theodore H. White (1915-1986): Born on May 6, 1915, he is an American journalist, historian, and novelist, the son of a lawyer. He graduated from the Boston Latin School in 1932, after graduating from Harvard University in 1938. He worked as a correspondent in East Asia for Time magazine from 1939 to 1945. Then he worked as a European correspondent for the Foreign News Agency (1948-1950), which enabled him to be able to analyze other cultures. He won the Pulitzer Prize in 1962 for non-fiction for the film The Making of the President (1960). He has many books related to American presidents, He died on May 15, 1986. See:
Benjamin C. Bradlee, The Theodore H. White Lecture, Jean Shorenstein Center: Harvard University, 1991, p.3-4.
- (49) Jong ChulPark ,op, cit., P.169 .
- (50) Ibid .
- (51) Memo. From Mr. Mcceorge Bundy the White House, July 22, 1961; AlexanderVucinich, op, cit., P.78.
- (52) Alexander Vucinich, op, cit.,P.78.
- (53) William J.Gregor , op, cit., p.66.
- (54) Ibid .
- (55) Dominique page , op, cit., P.52.
- (56) William J.Gregor , op, cit., p.66.
- (57) Dominique page , op, cit., P.52.
- (58) William Egan Colby (1920-1996): Born on January 4, 1920, an American intelligence officer who served as Director of Central Intelligence from September 1973 to January 1976. During World War II, he

worked with the Office of Strategic Services. After the war, he joined the CIA. Central Intelligence. Before and during the Vietnam War, he served as CIA station chief in Saigon, head of the CIA's Far East Division, and head of civilian operations and rural development efforts. Colby became Director of Central Intelligence and during his tenure, under intense pressure from Congress and the media, he adopted a policy of openness. Relatively speaking about US intelligence activities before the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives, he died on May 6, 1996. See:

John Prados, *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby*, Oxford university press, 2003, pp. 12-15.

(59) Dominique page , op, cit., P.52 .

(60) Ibid .

(61) Dominique page , op, cit., P.52 . .

(62) Ibid , P.53-53 .

(63) Alexander Vucinich, op, cit.,P.79 .

(64) Dominique page , op, cit., P.54 .

(65) Alexander Vucinich, op, cit.,P.79 .

(66) Dominique page , op, cit., P.55 .

(67) Alexander Vucinich, op, cit.,P.79 .

(68) Dominique page , op, cit., P.54 .

(69) Ibid, P.55 .

(70) Ibid .

(71) Dominique page , op, cit., P.55 .

(72) Ibid ., P.56 .

(73) Ibid .

(74) Thomas ,L.Abern, *CIA and the house NGO : Govert in south Vietnam 1954 -1963* ,center for the study of intelligence, 2000 .p 151 .

(75) Thomas .L. Abern ,op, cit., P.149 .

(76) Memorandum from the Action Assistant Secretary of Defense For International Security Affairs (Williams to the Secretary OF Defense (Mcnamamara), Washington , April 14, 1962 , Cited in : FRUS , Vol .II , P. 156 ; Hurley Robert Michael , op. cit .,pp.50-51.

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- [4] United State , Telegram , Department of State, presidential program for Vietnam, to the embassy in Saigon , cable , Bowles Chester , May 20 ,1961, Digital National Security Archive .
- [5] Memo, For the President, from: the White House, Washington, South East Asia August, 11,1961.
- [6] Memorandum from the Action Assistant Secretary of Defense For International Security Affairs Williams to the Secretary OF Defense (McNamara), Washington, April 14 ,1962 .
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